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Book Reviews
sion "closes deconstruction off from mindless charges of nihilism and subjectivism" even as it "closes religion off from mindless fundamentalism" (p. 279). Anyone today who would persist in claiming that Derrida has no significance for
religion-or religion for Derrida-can do so only by ignoring this complex, provocative, and masterful work.
THOMASA. CARLSON, Universityof California,Santa Barbara.
G. Nietzscheand Buddhism:A Studyin Nihilismand IronicAffinities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 250 pp. $62.00 (cloth).

MORRISON, ROBERT

Any mention of Nietzsche necessarily raises the question of which Nietzsche one
has in mind. In recent years, French deconstructionists have awarded him posthumous admission to the AcademieFranpaise.Jaspers and then Kaufmann taught
an earlier generation to think of him as a prophet of existentialism. Robert Morrison has made Nietzsche recognizable once again as a German Romantic. More
precisely, Morrison presents Nietzsche as a kind of romantic guru: a teacher interested in spiritual practice. Curiously, Morrison's return to Nietzsche's romanticism
is made possible by rereading him using Pali Buddhist thought. Morrison's reading of Nietzsche is all the more intriguing when we note that Nietzsche himself
not only predicted the West's current interest in Buddhism, but he was ready with
a harsh dismissal of it. With the death of God, a weakened and degraded bourgeoisie will be attracted to Buddhism's nihilism and passivity. Western dalliance
with Buddhism should be seen as a symptom of a cultural disease. For Nietzsche,
Buddhism's nihilism and passivity must be overcome by means of the will to
power.
In Morrison's view, Nietzsche was wrong about Buddhism as a form of passive
nihilism. In fact, Buddhism and Nietzsche bear "ironic affinities" with one another. To highlight these affinities, Morrison provides his readers with close textual comparisons bringing together a multitude of Nietzsche's works with texts
taken from the Pali Buddhist canon. Morrison's attention is focused almost exclusively on the correspondences between Nietzsche's ideas regarding will to power
and self-overcoming (Selbstiiberwindung)and the Buddhist notions of desire
(tanha) and mind cultivation (citta-bhdvand).
In a godless universe, a world without any transcendent basis for values, new
values must be established through the assertion of will. Nietzsche's notion of
will, in Morrison's reading, is similar to early Buddhist teachings regarding the
transformation of tanha. Rightly understood, the goal of Buddhist spiritual practice is not to annihilate desire. Buddhism seeks the transformation of desire from
egocentric clinging to compassionate action. Tanha can thus be either skillful or
unskillful. This distinction is central to Morrison's retrieval of Nietzsche. Like
tanha, will to power can also be either skillful or unskillful. Skillful will to power
leads to self-overcoming and the rise of the Ubermensch.Morrison also finds affinities between Nietzsche's demand for self-overcoming (Selbstiiberwindung)
and Pali
Buddhism's notion of mind cultivation (citta-bhdvand).For both Pali Buddhism
and Nietzsche, the human being is a welter of conflicting wills struggling for supremacy. The Ubermenscharises in the establishment of a higher quantum of
power by means of the overcoming of lower drives. Morrison makes connections
with Pali Buddhist traditions regarding the cultivation of mind through spiritual practice.
Morrison's is not the first effort at comparing Buddhism to Nietzsche. The
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relationship between the two, however, can vary considerably depending on what
side of the Pacific one is working from. Japanese interpreters of Nietzsche and
Buddhism, such as Nishitani Keiji, in his The Self OvercomingNihilism (Albany,
N.Y., 1990), and Abe Masao in his various essays on Nietzsche, offer their own
critiques of the West. If Nietzsche thought of Buddhism as symptomatic of the
disease of nihilism, these Japanese thinkers return the compliment in kind, only
now Nietzsche is symptomatic of the disease and Buddhism is held up as the cure.
Contrary to Nishitani and Abe, Morrison would make of Nietzsche a latter-day
practitioner of the Dharma by reading Buddhism as a kind of Nietzschean call to
will to power. Morrison ends several of his later chapters with the observation
that Nietzsche, had he the benefit of a more critical understanding of early Buddhism, could have learned much from its practical experience in spiritual practice. The book even concludes with the suggestion that we might think of the
historical Buddha as a kind of Ubermensch.
Did Siddhartha Gautama really preach a form of the will to power? One of
Morrison's many virtues is that he does not ask his readers to accept this conclusion without benefit of a carefully argued and critical treatment of the texts in
question. He also provides an evaluation of the materials on Buddhism available
to Nietzsche, even speculation on the import of Oldenberg's mistranslations of
early Pali texts. An affinity, no matter how ironic, does not a difference make. The
affinities Morrison traces between Nietzsche and Pali Buddhism allow him to read
both Nietzsche and Buddhism in unusual ways. The same, I believe, can be said
for the differences that distinguish the two. If will to power can be construed as
a form of skillful desire (tanha), should not compassion (karuna) be recognized
as a Buddhist form of ressentiment?Should this prove to be the case, the historical
Buddha would be a far cry from Nietzsche's Ubermensch.
JAMESL. FREDERICKS,
LoyolaMarymountUniversity.
K. The Persistenceof Purgatory. New York and Cambridge: CamFENN, RICHARD
bridge University Press, 1995. viii+209 pp. $49.95 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).

The doctrine of purgatory is one of those wonderful excrescences of the Christian
imagination. It has only the slimmest authorization in scripture, but it is a story
the very absence of which hollered out its need to be told in some form of midrash. Origen speculated about it, the thirteenth-century Council of Lyons established it as doctrine, Dante conjured it into an enduring alpine geography of the
soul, and the Council of Trent reaffirmed it in the face of its Protestant detractors.
Richard Fenn has written a book that is not about any of these wondrous details
but is every bit as good. Instead, he wants to know what became of purgatory as
Western societies relinquished it. His argument is that purgatory persists in our
conception of time and has, through moralizing our temporal consciousness,
given rise to the modern notion of the self.
In its classic form purgatory was, first, an ordeal that transpired in the afterlife,
a realm that shared the same "time zone" as life on earth. Sins were measurable
there in terms of time-each sin had units of time corresponding to it. Second,
purgatory was a way of describing transactions between the living and the dead.
The living had obligations to the dead to say prayers and make offerings on their
behalf in order to ease their torments and to relieve them of time they had ahead
of them in purgatory. Third, time was itself counting down to an end. At the end
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